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Abstract
China has become the world’s second largest economic entity following
its economic reform process begun over 30 years ago. Corporate gov-
ernance plays an important role in China economic success, but it also
has many problems. These include the concentration of state owner-
ship, management accountability and shareholder rights. Economic
reform has made the problems more apparent. This thesis studies
the evolution of corporate governance with the China’s economic re-
form process, and explores its strengths and weakness by comparing
current Chinese practices with western corporate governance models,
primarily that of the USA.
By investigation and the comparison, this thesis proposes four ways to
improve China’s corporate governance. These concern the following:
(1) implementation guidelines, (2) independence of board of directors,
(3) functionalities of internal audit, and (4) external structures of
corporate governance.
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1Introduction
1.1 Corporate Governance Definition
Corporate governance is commonly viewed as a system that delineates the rights
and responsibilities of each major group of shareholders in a company, and sets
rules and procedures for making decisions about company affairs [1]. It is “the
mechanism of pushing firms to operate efficiently and create value”, designed
to prevent potential exploitation of outside investors, particularly shareholders,
by corporate insiders, such as the management” [2]. It can also viewed as the
design of institutions and mechanisms that induce or control board directors and
management to best serve the interests of shareholders and other stakeholder in
a company, and to resolve conflicts among them, subject to the constraints of
economic, legal and ethical norms [3].
From various definitions of corporate governance, corporate governance struc-
ture is the core of modern enterprise system. Corporate governance is a broad
term to do with the manner, in which the rights and responsibilities are shared
among owners, managers and shareholders of a given company. The purpose of
corporate governance regime is the system by which business corporations are di-
rected and controlled. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which
the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance.
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1.2 Research Background
In recent history, China’s economic reforms and corporate governance have been
changing significantly. China’s economy over the last three decades, has staged
the strongest growth over any given period in history, for example, as the country
moved away from a purely state-owned, and a centrally planned economic system
to one where foreign capital and private enterprises are allowed. Nevertheless
the corporate governance still remains a large government-led, relationship-based
structure. Especially, the ownership of listed SOEs often remains under the state,
which determines that chairpersons, board of directors, CEOs and general man-
agers are also likely to be party members and government officials.
With the wide spread of globalization, Chinese firms, especially SOEs, are
facing challenges on the globalization. They have to play in accordance to in-
ternational rules if they want to increase their trade and connectivity with other
countries. Therefore, they adopt the international practices, including account-
ing standards. However, only employing the western rules and standards will not
improve corporate governance and accounting qualities in China as only these
standards do not help much.
Therefore, China has aligned itself more closely with the international econ-
omy, and it has also sought to adopt more western-style oversight mechanisms and
legal standards concerning the operation governance. With the rapid economic
growth, corporate governance is critically important for it provides the credibility
and confidence in the management that is fundamental to capital markets. In
turn, China’s economy reform accelerates the evolution of corporate governance.
1.3 Research Objectives
The objectives of this essay are: 1) to research the development of China’s corpo-
rate governance. In practice, the company ownership of a country is the national
companies ownership structure in accordance with the state characteristics, his-
tory, and cultural traditions as well as the factors, such as market structure
and the corporate governance structure with a characteristic pattern. 2) The
development of corporate governance evolves with the economic growth and en-
2
terprise reform. The research also investigates the economic growth process,
the achievement, and the enterprise reform which is the key element to the re-
form of corporate governance. 3) The research also compares western models, in
particular the US model. Through the comparison of different models, we can
better identify the problems of the corporate governance of China. 4) To explore
the key corporate governance problems in China, this thesis concentrate on the
government-led relational system, problems of Ownership and Control, and the
transparency problems of Corporate Governance. 5) The thesis offers solutions
for these challenges.
3
2Economic and Enterprise Reform
This chapter discusses China’s economic and enterprise reform. Corporate Gov-
ernance is one of the important factors to the success of economic reform. The
changes brought to China resulting from economic reform, especially the enter-
prise reforms, make a fundamental revolution for modern corporate governance
in China.
The economic system in China is called socialism market economic with Chi-
nese characteristics. It was started from December 1978 when the third Com-
munist Party of China Congress was held. Since then, it has proceeded more
than 30 years and it continues today. The policy has released China from the
constraints of planed economic, turning China into a modernization country, and
it has helped hundreds and millions of people out of poverty.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China began to open to the world, interna-
tional business trade was started, and the Contract Responsibilities System was
implemented in agriculture sector. During 1990s, six special economic zones were
established, including the zone of Shanghai Pudong, the pioneer of attracting
foreign investment. The reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s were focused
on the creation of pricing system - a dual track pricing system, and on decreasing
the role of the state in resource allocations. Some sectors such as distribution
were opened to both private enterprises and foreign capitals. In the past several
decades, China economic reform has made a spectacular success in all areas, as
its GDP has been growing with two-digit speed, especially after China became
a member of the WTO in 2001 [4]. Now China has established a market econ-
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omy system and a complete industry system. It is no longer self-sufficient in
agriculture, while it has undergone significant urbanization.
In the planed economic era, all companies were owned by the government with
no private enterprises allowed. However, during the past 30 years, the ownership
of companies has experienced unprecedented changes. The state-owned sectors
are mostly those critical departments like post, bank, railway, power, and so
on. However, some private and foreign capitals are increasingly allowed to invest
in these. Currently, there are four kinds of companies dominating the China
economic: state-owned companies, stock companies, private companies, and joint-
investment companies. It is possible there will be some other types of company
emerging in the future but it hard to predict at this moment.
2.1 The Process of Economic Reform
At the beginning of the reform, the goal was to generate sufficient surplus value
to finance the modernization of the Chinese economy. The first reform in the late
1970s and early 1980s consisted of opening trade to the outside world, instituting
the contract responsibilities system in agriculture, so that farmers could sell their
surplus crops and place them on the market. The government established the
Township-Village Enterprises.
Second step was to establish Special Economic Zones: By the end of the
1980s China had almost solved its food shortage problems. At the same time,
China established special economic zones which are Shenzhen, Pudong, Zhuhai,
Shantou ,Hainan and Xiamen. The most successful Special Economic Zone in
China is Shenzhen, which has developed from a small village into a city with a
population over 10 million within 20 years. The government provided a lot of
policies and economic advantages for these special Economic Zones, which made
the rapidly growth of these special economic zones. The main purpose is that the
special economic zones can lead the whole nations economic growth. The general
designer of China economic reform, Mr. Den Xiaoping, has a famous saying, a
cat is a good cat as long as it can catch mice no matter its colour is black or
white. The goal is success.
The third steps was to attract foreign investment inflows. In 2002, China
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became the worlds largest recipient of total foreign direct investment (FDI). That
performance comes thanks to China’s progress on structural reforms, including
replacing the complicated system of authorized foreign investment categories with
a simple and shorter list of sectors; accelerating the cumbersome approval process
for foreign investment projects, Opening stock and bond markets to enterprises
that are foreign-owned and Increasing transparency, particularly in the process
of formulating laws and regulations.
2.2 Enterprise Reform
Different to the planned economic which only state-owned enterprise existed,
the modern Chinese economic has the four kinds of enterprises as mentioned
above acting in each industry. During the reform of enterprise, many stated-own
enterprises were purchased by the private, foreign, or joint capital. The reform
has experienced a very hard time for the reason of efficiency many enterprises
had to cut their redundant employees. Therefore, many people lost their jobs,
or had to change to their jobs. On the other hand, the factories did not follow
central planning any more. Instead, their production is totally decided by the
need of market. In order to adapt to the fast-changing market environment, the
four main kinds of enterprises are playing their roles in China society.
State-owned Enterprise:
Early in the period of economic reform, there were about 65% state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) in totally industrial output (Figure 2.2). Sources from:National
Bureau of Statistics of People of Republic of China 2008. Most of them have been
reformed successfully but some enterprise, especially large ones, are proceeding
very slowly. One common characteristic is that they employ many people but low
efficiency, but might provide essential goods and services to the society. Many of
them have to rely on the government’s subsidies to survive. However, it is not
economically or politically feasible to simply shut them down for many people
will lose their jobs, in addition to essential services. For example, Sinopec (China
Petrol chemical Corporation) has a workforce estimated by Fortune magazine
to be over one million. Another Chinese petroleum-based SOE, China National
Petroleum Corporation, has a workforce estimated by Gordon Chang to be about
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one and a half million. There is already a serious unemployment problem par-
ticularly in rural areas and this is destined to become worse with the impact of
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The dilemma is that
the government cannot stop propping up the SOE’s because of the role of the
SOE’s as employers and providers of essential goods and services. But as long
as the government keeps propping them up, the SOE’s have little incentive to
change. Even when a SOE is nominally privatized, the subsequent treatment
of that enterprise by the government indicates that it is still a state-controlled
enterprise [6].
Figure 2.1: China’s Industrial Output by ownership(1985)
Sources from National Bureau of Statistics of People of Republic of China 2008
Stock Enterprises: These are former state-owned companies. These enter-
prises with some percentage of shares retained by the government offer a better
incentive system. The leaders who manage these enterprises usually possess some
shares through legal approach, including management buyout. For example, TCL
and Lenove which are two famous stock company in China. The entrepreneurs
and employees own stock shares as well as the state. Mostly, the state own bigger
percentages of the stock.
Private Enterprises: China’s private sector has developed from a minor
player into a significant components of the socialist market economy, and it is
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steadily growing. Its average rate of increase has kept abreast with the overall
development of China’s industry. The non-state sector of the economy is fac-
ing more opportunities for growth as the government has promised to open up
important markets to foreign and private investment. They include the telecom-
munications, retail and banking sectors. However, private enterprises are often
troubled by a lack of funds and technologies of weak management [7].
Foreign or Joint Venture Enterprises: Foreign enterprises in China also
refer to wholly foreign-owned enterprises, they are the enterprises established in
China by foreign companies, enterprises, other economic organizations or indi-
viduals in accordance with Chinese law and all the investment solely ordered by
foreign investors. According to China’s law on foreign enterprises, the establish-
ment of foreign enterprises in China must be conducive to the development of
China’s national economy, and must meet at least one of the following require-
ments that they will apply internationally advanced technology and equipment,
and that all or most of their products will be export-oriented. The corporate form
of foreign enterprises in China is generally the limited liability Company. Along
with the development of China’s experiment to introduce the system of Joint
stock partnership, a small number of foreign enterprises in China have adopted
the corporate form of joint stock limited company. Although China was relatively
late in introducing the system of establishing foreign enterprises, the establish-
ment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the country has developed relatively
rapidly over recent years. From the State Administration For Industry and Com-
merce (SAFIC), in 2008 foreign-funded enterprises have invested a total of US
$2.11 trillion in China as of the end of last year, up 23.5 percent year-on-year [8].
2.3 The Achievement of Economic Reform
In general the Chinese economic reform has been an economic success which
has generated rapid economic growth over two decades. Open organization and
internationalization have helped the transition to a market economy.
In 2009 GDP increased by 9.1% up to almost RMB 35,000 billions, which
makes China the second biggest economic body in the world(Figure 2.2). Opening
to the outside remains essential to China’s development. China emerged as the
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second biggest trade body, after the US. So, over the past two decades of reform,
the Chinese economy has achieved world-shaking changes. Since China’s entry
into WTO in 2001, the role of the Chinese central government derived from
spontaneous economic forces and the conscious decision by reformers to replace
direct central government involvement with indirect labour in the market, plus
increased local decision-making. In the past, before the China’s economic reform,
only the government played an important role in activities. Now it is enterprises
that do so. An estimated 400 million people have been lifted out of poverty;
perhaps 100 million people have been booted up the middle class; and China rose
from an economic backwater into the world’s second largest economy [5].
Figure 2.2: China GDP and real GPD growth rate from year 1978 - 2009 (Source
From world bank website)
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3Corporate Governance in China
3.1 The Development Stages
The historical corporate governance in China can be partitioned into four stages
with the time period of economic reform. To summarize: China launched a
major economic reform and liberalization program in 1980’s, which transformed
the planned economy to a market economy. Since then, the reform of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) has been considered the key to the success of China’s
economic growth. In 1990’s, the Chinese government reformed its SOEs through
incorporation, and the concept of modern enterprises was introduced accordingly
[17]. During this process, the separation of state ownership and control was
adopted, and company managers were granted control rights.
The pre-reform era from 1949 to1983, it was total state-owned enterprises
dominated in Chinese economy, during that time, the state controlled almost
every aspect of the economy, such as from manufacturing to distribution and
consumption. The entire workforce was paid through a national wage hierarchy,
which was modelled after the payment structure of government employees. There
was no western-style corporate governance.
The second stage from 1984 to 1993, marked the beginning of the separation
of government and enterprise. The Communist Party announced the decisions of
the Central Committee on Economic Structural Reform in 1983, indicating the
beginning of enterprise reform. The reform was not intended to change the state’s
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ownership, but to remedy the inefficiency of SOEs. The goal of committee was to
transform firms into economic entities that could make their own decisions and be
held responsible for their own profits or losses, in which to create a more effective
incentive scheme among Chinese companies. Therefore, the implementation of
the reform started with the policy of granting autonomy to companies and al-
lowing them to retain a certain portion of profit, which was soon followed by the
management contract system in the mid-1980s. The model of management con-
tract delineates profit-sharing rules through negotiations between management
team and related governmental agencies, and led to a steady increase in marginal
profit retention rates over the 1980s. In August 1984, the Shanghai Municipal
Government approved the first provincial-level regulation on securities, and more
SOEs followed the path of secularization. As a result, China formally established
the SSE and SZSE in 1990. The next year, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), was a government body for serving the country’s main reg-
ulator of the newborn stock market. Those were remarkable steps for corporate
governance of China [9].
The third stage marked the beginning of experimentation in the modern en-
terprise structure from 1994 to 2005. The People’s Congress issued China’s first
Company Law in December 1993. It was not only the first comprehensive law that
fully delineated the rights and responsibilities of modern companies, but also the
first major business law that did not differentiate legislation for companies based
on their ownership structures. Although, the company law has significant impact
on corporate governance and the economy as a whole in China, the Chinese eco-
nomic system still suffered from overwhelming favouritism toward the SOEs. The
SOEs continued to enjoy favourable treatment from the initial process of com-
pany establishment all the way through to public offerings of securities, and they
therefore continued to survive even after the enactment of the 1993 Company
Law. The state was misplaced its role as a regulator and social planner aimed
at maximizing the aggregate social welfare, or its role as a regulator and social
planner aimed at maximizing shareholder profit. However, after the passage of
the 1998 Securities Law, the power of the CSRC was significantly strengthened
and it took a more active role in monitoring and regulating corporate governance
of public companies.
11
The final stage from 2006 onward involved legislations to balance the power
between state shareholders and individual shareholders in Chinese company. It
was the period of continuing growth of corporate governance in China. The stocks
of two-thirds of China’s security markets were non-tradable until 2005, which
included both the state-owned shares and legal-person shares that are owned
by employees and parent companies. Those non-tradable shares constituted a
significant and persistent risk for minority investors in tradable shares; so Chinese
government initiated a program to fully circulate listed companies’ non-tradable
shares. In October 2005, the National People’s Congress passed a revision of
China’s Company Law, which lowered the threshold for companies’ public listing.
Continually, the National People’s Congress amended the 1998 Securities Law in
2006 [25]. The goal is to balance the power asymmetry between the state owner
and the minority shareholders. The new Securities Law lifted the ban that kept
public listed companies from entering new industries. In order to protect investor
interest, it required an investor protection funds be established with financing
from investment banks.
Through four stages development, Chinese lawmakers still work toward clos-
ing the corporate governance gap between China and developed countries. The
executive branch has also moved ahead in protecting minority shareholders.
3.2 The Evolution of Governance Infrastructure
2001 was a noticeable year in the process of corporate governance evolution.
Caijing Magazine, a popular financial publication, unveiled the biggest scandal
in China’s economic history. It was YingGuangXia fraud matter [10]. Ying-
GuangXia case reflected the weakness of China’s legal, regulatory, and accounting
systems. However, it drew attentions from corporate governance regulators and
public investors. Since then, China’s government accelerated the development
of laws, rules, legislators and regulators. China made remarkable strides in all
sectors within very short period, encompassing financial and bank infrastructure,
legal and regulatory environment and the information disclosure infrastructure.
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3.2.1 Financial and Bank Infrastructure
3.2.1.1 Financial Market
As discussed before, the economic reform transform China’s economy from a to-
tally planned to a market economy. A symbolic event was the establishment of
its first stock exchange in Shanghai (1991), and Shenzhen (1992). Although there
are some certain industries, like bank industry, telecommunication industry, na-
tional media and relevant publication are still highly regulated by the government
in 1990s, China’s accession to WTO accelerate deregulation of these industries.
As more international companies enter Chinese market, the PRC economy
has to decrease its heavy reliance on administrative and policy support, and
adapt itself to the competition rules of real market economy. China’s government
should change its role from that of approving or endorsing any business activity
towards acting as a real policy-maker, implementer, enforcer and evaluator. That
will also cause diversification government ownership structure, for example, state
ownership changes to private businesses. The state-owned Enterprises can publish
a portion of company shares in the public markets. Until now, listed companies’
capital structure can consist of state-owned shares, legal person shares, A shares,
B shares, H shares, and other foreign investment shares. A shares incorporated
in mainland, Currently, they are mainly traded with Chinese and selected foreign
institutional investors are allowed to trade A. B shares’ markets are Shanghai and
Shenzhen, and they are quoted in foreign currencies. In the past, only foreigners
were allowed to trade B shares. But since 2001, Chinese can trade B shares as well.
H shares are listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, the origin of business should
be mainland China, and the H shares are available to international investors.
It was estimated that the PRC equity market are mainly dominated by indi-
vidual investors, only 0.4% of total investments are under the name of institu-
tional investors [11]. Except equity market, there is small and underdeveloped
domestic bond market. It was controlled by central government and the mainly
investors are individual investors.
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3.2.1.2 Bank Market
Currently in China, there are four types of national banks, the central bank,
policy banks, state-owned banks and commercial banks. altogether 24 banks in
China [12]. China has highest savings rate equivalent in the world. The saving
rate was approximately 20% of GDP in 1981, and it increased to 43.4% of GDP
in 2005 [13]. The majority of national savings are in bank deposits, with a small
percentage in equity investments. Chinese corporations, especially SOEs rely
largely for bank loans and policy lending for funding.
The state-owned banks and state policy banks are the mainly dominated both
lending and bank deposit markets in China. China economic reform transformed
a planned economy to a market economy, in spite of which most banks’ lending
remained policy lending. At the beginning of the reform, all these banks had
very poor internal risk control systems. The huge amount of money lent to SOEs
which were in serious financial difficulties, caused very serious non-performing
loan problems.
China’s accession to WTO bring both challenges and opportunities to China’s
banking industry. In short period, domestic banks have had to face pressures
by opening up financial markets to international competition. But the foreign
banks have influenced local banks in positive ways on management skills, product
diversification, new technology, additional funding sources and customer service
awareness.
3.2.2 Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure
3.2.2.1 Legal System Infrastructure
China’s legal history only has a half century. The highest authorization to legis-
late is the National People’s Congress (NPC). In China, the standing committee
of the NPC has the power to interpret laws, to issue laws and draw up decrees.
At the beginning of the process, many basic laws, rules, and codes were prelimi-
narily made up during 1949 to 1956. As China’s historical and political reasons,
the basic laws and rules were really underdeveloped and often retracted on many
aspects of society. It was not until 1978 that the National People’s Congress
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began to issue Criminal Law, Civil Procedures Law, Administration Law, Peo-
ple’s Court Administration Law, and other areas earliest laws. The process of
issuing laws not only involved regulations but also a large element of the Chinese
culture, which in turn, grants more discretionary power of implementation and
enforcement processes.
3.2.2.2 Company Laws Infrastructure
China’s first Company Law was passed by the National People’s Congress in
December 1993, and it was effective in 1994, amended in 1999. The first com-
pany law stipulated two types of companies that are limited liability companies
and joint stock companies, which intended to regular corporation structures and
activities, also to protect commercial interests for the companies, shareholders,
and creditors. The Law articulated the responsibilities, rights and liabilities of
corporation management and shareholders. For instance, under the PRC Com-
pany Law, directors and managers are insiders. The Company Law articulated
the board of supervisors should be the independent “outsider”. The Law gave
shareholders the right to appoint and to remove directors and supervisors. After
the first company law published, there are many other securities and commercial
laws were passed as follows :Securities Law, passed and effective in 1998; Con-
tract Law, in 1999, Bankrupt Law in1998, PRC Trust Law in 2001 and the law
of Commercial Instruments.
3.2.2.3 Regulatory Infrastructure
In order to enact and supplement the Company Law, there are a series of listing
rules and regulations published to regulate capital market and listed company
activities.
Fist, the people’s Bank of China (PBOC) not only regulate financial markets,
but also acts as an administrator in formulating and implementing monetary
policy. In March, 2003, the State Council set up a new China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) that is taking over the regulatory responsibilities from the
PBOC. CBRC is responsible for drafting and enforcing banking-related laws,
rules, and regulations. The PRC’s national currency RMB is not fully opened to
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international markets, and it is under the supervision of PBOC. Also, the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) looks after foreign currency trading
activities.
Second, PRC’s capital market is centrally regulated. The highest authority
for the capital markets is the state Council Securities Commission (SCSC). China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the executive institution of SCSC
responsible for conducting supervision and regulation duties. The CSRC estab-
lishes supervisory authority over all securities and futures business, such as listed
company stocks, funds, investment funds. The CSRC released the first Code
of Corporate Governance in January2002, it requires all listings must comply
with PRC Company Law. It also supervises the key listing rules of securities
codes and regulations, the structure of board, the rights of Shareholders and the
requirements.
Third, the Company Law requires listed companies to adopt a two-tier board
structure and it should consist of two-thirds top executives and one-third inde-
pendent directors. This system is similar to Germany’s mechanism. In Germany,
the two-tier board structure and extensive labour representation are defining fea-
tures of Germany’s internal control mechanisms. The internal control functions
contain supervisory board, management, insiders, outsiders, which are most like
China’s system[14]. Actually, under this two-tier structure, the board of direc-
tors, as the core board should works closely with the management. However,
in China’s , board members and top management are both from same group of
person. That means that ownership and control are not separated, which causes
a lot of problems. The Company Law also regulate all shareholders should have
equal rights in profit sharing and participation in shareholder meetings, but it is
difficult for the minority shareholders to form a large meeting for their rights.
Fourth, Over-regulation and structural imbalances, in combination with its
poorly manage transition toward full economic integration are common themes
that characterizes most Asian governance systems. China is no exception in
this situation [15]. In China, selective force and interest group enforcement are
commonly seen in all aspects of corporate governance. So, corporate risk-taker
frequently challenge the system. Therefore, the code of Corporate Governance
requires listed companies to establish intensive and control systems. But the
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practice of establishing incentive systems seem not work well in China’s corporate
governance.
3.2.3 Informational Infrastructure
3.2.3.1 Accounting Standards and Implementation
China Accounting Standards Committee (CASC) started developing a range of
accounting standards since 1993, which is under the supervision of the Chinese
Ministry of Finance(MOF). The initiative project was “Accounting Reform and
Development Project” from international Development Association in 1999 [16].
This project completed the local standards by introducing new International Ac-
counting Standards (IAS) or amending the old standards. In 2002, there were 16
accounting standards issued. CASC work for narrowing the differences between
the existing PRC standards and IAS, but it still have some major differences in
key areas. For example, Chinese accounting may differ from that required by
IAS due to the absence of specific Chinese rules on recognition and measurement
in some areas. And there might no specific rules requiring disclosures on some
certain areas such as the fair value of investment properties, the discontinuing
operations and ect. There are also inconsistencies between the PRC standards
and IAS on certain subsidiaries. Or in certain enterprises, like finance leases could
lead to difference from IAS [11].
The implementation of accounting standards and system is the key challenge
on corporate governance. China’s National Audit Office randomly checked the
auditing work of 16 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) firms. And it was found
huge fabrication financial statement with 72% of financial report, 86% of CAP
firms’ audit engagements, and 41 accountants were involved in those seriously
inconsistent facts [11]. This clearly show the serious problems in corporate gov-
ernance, alerting the regulators to apply more strict compliance requirement.
3.2.3.2 Information and Transparency Disclosure
Except the Company Law, the Code of Corporate Governance requires listed
companies to disclose related information of Corporate Governance, publish the
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discrepancy between the actual situation and the requirements in the Code, and
the improvement plan for corporate governance.
In 2001 and 2002, the CSRC released a series of disclosure standards and
requirements to ensure quality of disclosure. The new standards requires the
heads of the company, the accounting department, and external accounting firm to
make a public announcement ensuring true an complete disclosure of the reports.
The standards also require the public listed companies to disclose financial results
by quarterly basis and publicise significant events that may impact stock prices
immediately.
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4The Comparison of Corporate
Governance Models
4.1 Western Models
Corporate governance refers the relationship between the owners and manage-
ment of a corporation in organization. The type of regime can be quite different
in term of the countries’ structure differences. It also reflects the different eco-
nomic circumstances and national traditions. Therefore, to discuss the corporate
governance systems, the context of the societies in which the country function
should be considered.
Normally, the wider the distribution of shareholding, the greater is the role of
the market in the exercise of corporate control. Shareholding in several continen-
tal European countries in rather concentrated, so that their corporate governance
problems are less frequent or at least apparently so [19].
In the world’s major developed countries, due to the differences on the social
history and cultural traditions, on political and economic systems, and due to the
differences of the property rights model, financing methods, and capital market
structure, there arise different ownership structures and, as a result, different
corporate governance models. Generally, corporate governance can be classified
as ”Anglo-American model” or to ”Germany and Japanese models.”
The major feature of Anglo-American model is the securities market, and
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it is characterized by dispersed ownership. The concept of Anglo-American is
implementing contract doctrine. It pursuits value maximization on behalf of
the shareholder. In the Anglo-American model, the securities market is highly
developed and the company ownership is dispersed. However, banks only play
limited role in corporate governance, but the securities market and associated
market for corporate control in corporate governance is very prominent.
Germany and Japanese models are as bank-cantered, and characterized by
ownership concentration. The securities market is not as developed as in the
Anglo-American system, and the information disclosure and market transparency
standards are rather low. The market for corporate control is not active, as stock
ownership is concentrated and controlled by large corporate ownership. Banks
dominate capital markets and play an important role in corporate governance.
As a result, these two models have different features. Anglo-American model
is market-oriented, and dispersed ownership structure characterises the capital
market. Shareholders actively monitor management constraints by using voting
rights. The Anglo-American model focus on market mechanisms, competition and
bankruptcy or other external governance mechanisms. It pays a lot of attention
to the interests of shareholders, which is in line with recent global corporate
governance trends.
The Anglo-American model seeks to combine directors interests and share-
holders interests through reasonable compensation and incentive mechanisms. A
significant and controversial example is the use of stock options to stimulate the
operators and shareholder to work hard in the shareholders’ best interests.
German-Japanese model is organization-oriented. It restrains company man-
agers through strict organizational structure. Germany-Japanese model em-
phasizes the investors, corporate staffs and equal participation of trade unions.
German-Japanese model pays attention to shareholders in corporate governance
role, which represents another trend in the development of corporate governance
structure in the world today.
In the practice of building and improving corporate governance structure in
China, focusing more Germany and Japanese for reference model. China’s cor-
porate governance model is different to U.S model.
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4.2 The Comparison between China and U.S
The detailed of corporate governance systems in China and America is as shown
in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Governance Structure in the China and America
Criteria China America
Regulation Corporate Law 1993, Securi-
ties Law 1998, CSRC
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA),
SEC. and NYSE listing re-
quirements
Applicability
of corporate
governance
Publicly held corporations
that can be listed or non-listed
Public companies
Shareholders
and insti-
tutional
investors
State investor in SOEs; some
outside shareholder ownership;
institutional investors lacking
Individuals and companies;
important role for institutional
investors
Board of
Directors and
Supervisor
At least 33% independent di-
rectors. No requirement for
non-management directors to
meet without management.
Supervisory board can over-
turn director decisions.
Majority of independent di-
rectors. Non-management di-
rectors meet without manage-
ment
Audit Com-
mittee
Majority of independent direc-
tors including the chair. Com-
mittee reviews internal audit
and controls and oversees fi-
nancial disclosures. Not re-
quired to meet separately with
management or auditors.
At least 3 independent direc-
tors. Meet separately with
management and independent
auditors. resolve disagree-
ments between management
and auditors on accounting is-
sues. Review internal controls
Certification
of financial
statements by
management
Does not address this issue Certification required by
CEOs and CFOs
Internal con-
trol report
Not addressed by regulations Prepared by management; au-
ditors independently assess re-
port
Corporate
governance
report
Comply or explain gaps be-
tween existing practices and
recommendations in the Code;
no penalty for failing to do so
Disclosure of corporate gover-
nance guidelines; CEO certi-
fication. Listed foreign com-
panies must disclose practices
that do not comply with Amer-
ica requirements
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5Corporate Governance Problems
in China
After more than 20 years reform of corporate governance, a large number of state-
owned enterprises were transferred into public companies through restructuring,
mergers and acquisitions. Those state-owned enterprises have helped to take total
market capitalization forward.
At the end of December 2010, there were total in number of 2042 listed com-
panies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. The market value reached 27.5
trillion, with third quarter operating income of 12.3 trillion yuan. But the total
listed state-owned enterprises account for more than 80% in total stock market
[22]. State holding listed companies cover aerospace, telecommunications, energy,
transportation, equipment, manufacturing and finance industries.
Therefore, the state holding listed companies comprise the main ownership
structure of China’s listed companies. The failure or success of corporate gover-
nance reform is an important factor of state-owned enterprise reform, which is
not only to achieve the objective of an important value-added identity, but also
is related to the health development of capital markets.
But precisely because the state-owned enterprises account for the weight ratio
of listed companies, it leads to significant problems of corporate governance.
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5.1 Structure Problems of State-owned Enter-
prises
The Institution framework of listed companies is complicated in China, as there
are many government entities playing an important role in corporation activities.
The institution of listed corporation can be described into an inner structure and
an outer structure.
First, the inner structure contains shareholders general meeting, the manage-
ment of corporate and the auditing system. The inner entities effectively direct
companies. However, due to the short period of development of corporate gover-
nance, Chinese corporation are always lacking experienced personnel. The short-
ages of the professional knowledge make their corporate governance inefficiency.
Additionally, since the most management teams compise government officials, it
brings a lot of conflict-of-interest problems in a government-controlled economy.
Second, the outer structure contains the regulators, the legal system, the in-
stitutional investor, auditing system and stock exchange activities. The outer
entities have a significant impact on corporation governance, as they can con-
trol companies through publishing regulations, codes of conducts, certification of
financial reports, or legal enforcement, and so on.
Through 20 years development, China’s state-owned enterprise reform and
corporate governance reform gain huge process. A large number of joint-stock
corporations and state-owned enterprises have already achieved a lot of process,
especially on the organizational form, enterprises restructuring, and governance
structure areas. However, the operating mechanism still remains a product of
the original system. Since more than 80% of listed companies are state-owned
corporation. That rises a lot of problems, contradictions and shortcomings in the
new forms of corporate governance. The chapter analyses these problems.
5.2 Problems of External Environment
Governance mechanisms could play an important role outside the company only
if the economic market is under the capital market competition.Government
24
should through the implementation of their economic functions, create an ef-
fective macro-control system and perfect the social security system to bring a
healthy, mature market system.However, the structure of external environment
towards state-owned companies and corporate governance reform process suffers
from following problems:
5.2.1 Capital Market Problems
Although China’s stock market have achieved great development in recent years,
but the number of listed companies is limited, so the stock market capacity is
small, and it is not standardised.First,in Chinese stock market, more than two-
thirds of listed companies are state-owned companies. So, the proportion of
state shares and legal person shares are too large. The state shares are mostly
no-tradeable shares, andtradeable shares account for a very small proportion
of total share capital. That means a considerable portion of shares are not in
circulation, which loss the vitality of the stock, the stock market could not play
its full function to allocate resources.
5.2.2 Problems of Stock Market
Firstly, there are serious stock market segmentation problems. In China, the
shares of one stock company can be circulated in different market flow, such as
A-share market, B-share market and H-share market, and each share in different
stock markets has different circulation conditions. That results in the same share
having different interests and different price in different share market.
Secondly, there are no institutional investors on the stock market. If stock
markets do not have institutional investors, the stock market is an immature
market.Securities market include a wide range of content, including the stock
market.If the stock market can be developed, the securities market can really
play its function of resource allocation. That benefits the whole stock market.
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5.3 Problems of External Monitoring Mecha-
nism
Banks and other creditors have limited monitoring implementation on listed com-
panies. Although China has established a relatively good relationship between
banks and enterprises, but the current law prohibit equity investments of com-
mercial banks to the securities industry and non-financial sectors. In these sectors
there is no board representatives from commercial banks. The external market
for corporate controlling is also very limited.After the split share structure reform
launched, state-owned shares and legal person shares can be gradually traded, at
least theoretically. The performance evaluations of state-owned enterprises have
gradually become dominated by the company’s stock price, which in future will
provide the conditions for the strengthening of external control.
Improving the managerial labour market is another important external mech-
anisms of oversight companies. China’s Capital Market and the current ownership
structure greatly limit the behaviour of manager market that are binding on the
role of the operators.In the absence of evaluation mechanisms, managers mar-
ket cultivation does not have the practical operability in China. Therefore, the
monitoring role of the market is also very limited.
5.4 Problems of Internal Governance
5.4.1 Ownership Structure Problems
China institution frameworks determine the concentration of state ownership.
For example, the company law empowers shareholders general meeting to be the
ultimate decision making entity for a corporation. However, the attendance at
general meeting has been very low in China, and the controlling shareholders have
dominated it. Chinas corporate governance is the weak protection of individual
shareholders rights. This is because the majority shareholders are typically very
strong, while the individual shareholders are extremely weak, and most individual
shareholders do not attend the general meetings because they have limited voting
rights, and they could not influence the corporation decisions.
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The important management structures on corporate governance are the own-
ership structure, board of supervisors and senior management incentive.First, the
ownership structure is the foundation of corporate governance and it plays a deci-
sive role. This is because it determines the board of directors, the composition of
the board of supervisors and managers. The Board is the executive agency for the
company. Therefore, it has important impact on corporate governance. Second,
establishing effective incentive and restraint function for senior management is
the key factor to improve the corporate governance structure.
5.4.2 Lack of Independence on Board of Directors
The direct result of ownership concentration is the lack of independence among
board directors. In China, the supervisory board has not played an efficient role in
corporate governance. There is no laws giving rights to supervisors for taking civil
litigation against board directors or senior managers, when they detect company
misconduct. Moreover, the supervisors are usually selected from the companies
employees or from former communist cadres in the state owned enterprise who
could not fit in other positions in a corporative organization. In this way, peo-
ple who are supposed to supervise, directly determine the financial interests of
corporation. The supervisory board usually has labour union, party and major
shareholder representation. Therefore, they do not play effective governance role.
But with development of corporate governance, the situation has improved,
but there remain problems. Currently, Chinas Company Law stipulates that the
board of directors determines all major business decisions, and the shareholders
meeting elect the board of directors. In practice, directors appointment or dis-
missal does not require a shareholders meeting, and the election of chairman are
actually appointments by the higher authorities. As the board establishments are
not standardized, there is no legislation and reasonable remuneration. Therefore,
the board of directors often does not act independently and the board executive
order becomes higher intermediary transferee.
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5.4.3 Limited Function of the Board of Supervisors
Board of directors is parallel to the supervisory board in corporate enterprises.
The supervisory board is only part of the supervision, and they do not have con-
trol and strategic decision-making power, neither no rights to appoint or remove
board members or senior manager. The Company Law and other regulations of
corporate governance specific the shareholder value-oriented, which only attach
the importance to the role of the boards position and ignore the supervisory
board. So the board of supervisors is really just a board controlled by delibera-
tive bodies. First, exposure to a specific company running under the governance
structure of financial accounting information system, its information disclosure
and corporate governance structure is subject to a crucial impact, corporate gov-
ernance not only helps to regulate the implementation of accounting information
disclosure standards and specific content but also help to improve the quality of
accounting information disclosure.
5.5 Transparency Problems
5.5.1 Transparency on Corporate Governance
From the perspective of modern capital markets, corporate governance and in-
formation disclosure constitutes an integral part of efficient operation on capital
market. First, accounting disclosure is running under the governance structure
of financial information system and it is crucial to corporate governance. Cor-
porate governance not only helps to regulate the implementation of information,
but also to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. On the
other hand, the disclosure of accounting information is an important factor on
corporate governance, and its system of quality improvement directly affect the
operating results which is related to the success of corporate governance. There
remain some transparency problems, however.
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5.5.2 False Accounting Information
Some listed companies need to publish financial information. However, some over-
value the companies assets, and make false packaging. For example, some listed
companies incorporated into the price of unrelated assets to the stock market,
which is together with other related assets. It increases tens of millions of inflated
capital. If the company do not make any profits or even have seriously losses,
then it make false accounts and turn it into blue-chip companies. A umber of
listed companies disclose false information intentionally, in order to mislead small
investors with the promulgation false information. There is real case about false
accounting information of YinGuangXia fraud.
GuangXia(Yinchuan) limited Industry Company is listed on stock market in
June, 1994. It was Known as Chinas first blue chip as its remarkable performance
and attractive prospects.According to YinGuangXia annual report, its year earn-
ings for per share reached 0.51Yuan. The initial share price from 13.97 raised
to 35.88 Yuan with the date from December 30, 1999 to April 19, 2000. And it
reached 37.99Yuan on 29 of December 2000. It increased 440% within one year,
which was eight times increasing compared former year. It was until August 2001,
one Chinese finance magazine of CaiJing disclosed that it was totally because of
false finance information. From 1997 to 2001, YinGuangXia made fictitious sales
ravenous as 1 billion Yuan, the benefits of it was more than 700 million Yuan
[10].
5.5.3 Insufficient Information Disclosure
In China, many listed companies only disclosed by industry segment for the year’s
main business revenue, operating profits, the main business products, and the
proportion of income and operating profit increases or decrease. But they do
not disclose the required number which is comparing with the previous year. So,
the disclosures are covering limited accounting information, and it is difficult for
investment decision-makers to understand the complete information.
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5.5.4 Untimely Information Disclosure
The Disclosure of accounting information is not timely, so that it reduces the
value of information usages. In the stock market, that whether listed companies
timely disclose accounting information is directly related to many investors of
their vital interests. Currently, in China, the vast majority of listed companies
basically be able to do performance report disclosed within the prescribed time,
but not timely disclose of the major events. For the majority of stock investors,
the misleading distortion of accounting information will affect their investment
decisions, and even cause losses due to investment mistakes. It will reduce investor
confidence. Therefore, the stock market is not conducive to normal development.
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6The Improvement of Corporate
Governance
As summarized in previous chapter, the five main problems of corporate gover-
nance in China are structure problems, external environment and capital market
problems, external monitoring mechanism problems and internal governance and
transparency problems. In this chapter, the suggest improvement towards each
problems as follows:
6.1 Shares Reduction and Structure Improve-
ment
6.1.1 State-owned Shares Reduction
State-owned equity can be phased out, where those listed companies are oper-
ating on a non-economic basis and therefore not competitive, strong companies.
Government should reduce the concentration of state-owned shares, and acceler-
ate the free flow of state. In this ways, the state can achieve diversified equity
owners, and can accept new investors such as banks, investment funds, and in-
dividual funds. Particularly, it can attract and encourage enterprise investors
who represent the interests of individual investors. Additionally, the enterprise
investors, coupled with its expert management, so it will effectively inspire and
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supervise over listed companies.
6.1.2 Increasing Company Managers Shares
Listed companies should increase managers shareholdings, and expand their stakes
timely. Also, listed companies should make managers individual benefits associ-
ated with companies achievements. In this ways, company managers can increase
the consideration of long-term development and growth for listed companies.
If company managers could achieve enterprise business goals, listed companies
should promise its higher income.
6.2 Developing Bond Markets
A developed capital market is the regulator and controller of listed companies
optimization. In China, the lag in the development of bond market results in
a single means of financing of listed companies. Those impacts stock market
optimizing resources and financing methods. On developed international capital
market, the size of bond market is much larger than the size of stock market,
which reminds that the bond market should be vigorously developed. To promote
healthy development of the bond market that coordinated with stock market, the
existing system should be improved as follows:
6.2.1 Market Reform on Issuing System
Bond issuing qualification should be changed from examination and approval sys-
tem to registration system. The bond market should continue to meet the issuing
needs of large high quality enterprise, while the market should allow eligible pri-
vate enterprises issuing bonds, and eliminate the discrimination against non-state
owned enterprises bonds.
6.2.2 Reducing Administrative Interference
Board of supervisors main task is to monitor insiders and management. How-
ever, most Chinese companies have a strong management but weak and non-
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independent supervisory boards. It should be clearly defined the functions of
supervisory board. There is a CSRC rule starting in June 2003, it requires all
listed companies have at least one-third of board of directors are independent
directors.
On the other hand, government should reduce its administrative interference
on bond market, and let market condition determine the bond interest rate.
Interest rates are the prices of capital, and it reflects the degree of scarce funds.
Also, it represents the benefits and risks of investors on bond market. Only
after interest rate liberalization, the different credit rating and liquidity on bonds
market could form different interest rates, which reflect its intrinsic value, and
“high risk with high return, low risk with low income”. In this way, there are
different interest rate bond to meet varieties investors on market, and thus attract
more funds into market.
6.2.3 Increasing Bond Products
Due to the differences of company interests, assets, financing, investments and
other purposes, bonds have different requirements on issuing. Chinas bond prod-
ucts are limited, and investors do not have so many choices, which is difficult to
evade risks. Therefore, bond products innovation can provide both issuers and
investors with a wide choice of products.
6.2.4 Establishing Credit Rating System
Credit Rating System is the assessment to investment value, solvency and risk
rates on bond market. Company credit is the vital factor for one company issued
its bonds.If credit rating and evaluation system is not health, it would seriously
hinders the healthy development of the bond market. Therefore, it is important
to cultivate credit rating agencies, in order to provide objective, fair, scientific as-
sessments to investors who can make investment decisions based on the companys
credit rating.
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6.3 Monitoring Mechanism and Incentive Man-
agers
Currently, there are more than 80% state-owned stocks in China. Government
officials represent state-owned capital, but they do not have rights to gain more
enterprise asset. They have fixed salary and benefits, which cause less enthusiasm
of supervision and motivation. Additionally, the minority shareholder have lim-
ited supervisory role to managers. So, company managers are lack of supervision
and control.
Therefore, listed companies should develop manager market on the external
environment, so that make listed-companys managers have potential competitors.
If listed companies lost their interests due to managers inefficient operations,
which managers would keep their reputation declined and their own human capi-
tal would get reduction. That is not conducive to their future career development.
On the other hand, listed companies should design optimal selection, encourage-
ment and supervision mechanism on the internal governance structure.
The listed company also should strengthen the mechanism for shareholders to
enforce their rights, such as enhancing shareholders voting mechanism, entitling
shareholders to seek answers from the board of directors, and increasing legal
obligation of controlling shareholders.
6.3.1 Establishment of Effective Selection System
Listed-company should introduce a competition mechanism, job and payments
incentive for managers. For example, shareholders and managers can arrange a
previous payment system of reward performance. In this way, it not only can
determine managers income according their performances, but also reduce the
moral hazard of managers.
6.3.2 Equity for Managers
Listed companies should give equity to managers, and linked their own interests
with shareholders interests. If managers can make more benefits to companies
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as well themselves, they would make best efforts on investment selections and
carefully carrying large project.
6.3.3 Strengthen Board of Supervisory Functions
Listed companies should give substantial powers to board of supervisors, such as
the major resolutions should passed by board of supervisors. Board of supervi-
sors should participate in recruitment, assessment of managers. Therefore, the
personnel of board should understand business growth, with professional skills
and well checking abilities.
6.4 Audit Financing Standard
Government should strictly examine the qualifications of listed companies and se-
lect really qualified companies to stock market. Stock issuing should implement
real approval system so that companies can determine if they offer shares or issue
rights according to their actual operating conditions and capital market condi-
tions. Then, enterprises take all risks of stock market. Board of supervisors also
should strictly audit dividends and dividend in proportion to listed companies.
Government should track the whole process supervision of listed companies,
and investigate if its rights of issue funding is consistent with the originally plan.
Board of supervisors all should investigate if the project earnings is as expected.
If they do not in accordance with the provisions, board of directors should set
more restrictions in terms of rights issue, or issue new shares, and punish listed
companies. Therefore, companies strengthen the using rights of issue funding
constraints, which can limit the listed companies to some extent.
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7Conclusions and Future Work
The economic reform in China started in 1978. Now, China has become the
second largest economic entity in the world, ranked after the United States. The
securities market, the corporate governance structure and company law have
played an important role in the economic reforms, and will continue to do so.
Since 1992, China has been making substantial progress in (1) specifying the
rights of shareholders, (2) clarifying the duties and responsibilities of directors,
(3) increasing independence of board of directors, (4) emphasizing the importance
of information disclosure and transparency (5) specializing the auditor process,
and (6) providing guidelines guarding against misuse of insider information and
related party transactions.
This thesis has investigated the challenges and problems of corporate gover-
nance in China, and has proposed the solutions for these problems. This thesis
also discussed China’s economic reform and subsequent economic growth, as these
are highly relevant to the subject of corporate governance. The interaction be-
tween the system of corporate governance and economic performance is complex
and drives the pressure for further changes in governance laws and practices.
Since 2008, the world’s economic has been in rescission. Though it brought
significant impact to China, it was not enough to divert China’s economy from
the path of sustained growth. It would be interesting to investigate the reasons
behind China’s economic success during this recent period, and more specifically
the role that its corporate governance arrangements played in sustaining economic
growth during the financial crisis of 2008 onwards.
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